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A Characterization of Stochastically Stable Networks 
 
Summary 
Jackson and Watts [J. of Econ. Theory 71 (2002), 44-74] have examined the dynamic 
formation and stochastic evolution of networks. We provide a refinement of pairwise 
stability, p−pairwise stability, which allows us to characterize the stochastically stable 
networks without requiring the "tree construction" and the computation of resistance 
that may be quite complex. When a 1/2−pairwise stable network exists, it is unique and 
it coincides with the unique stochastically stable network. To solve the inexistence 
problem of p−pairwise stable networks, we define its set-valued extension with the 
notion of p−pairwise stable set. The 1/2−pairwise stable set exists and is unique. Any 
stochastically stable network is included in the 1/2−pairwise stable set. Thus, any 
network outside the 1/2−pairwise stable set must be considered as a nonrobust network. 
We also show that the 1/2−pairwise stable set can contain no pairwise stable network 
and we provide examples where a set of networks is more "stable" than a pairwise 
stable network. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The organization of individual agents into networks and groups or coalitions has an impor-
tant role in the determination of the outcome of many social and economic interactions.1
There are many possible approaches to model network formation. One is simply to model
it explicitly as a non-cooperative game (see e.g. Aumann and Myerson, 1988). A diﬀerent
approach is to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the long run and
to examine a sort of stability requirement that individuals not beneﬁt from altering the
structure of the network. This is the approach that was taken by Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) when deﬁning pairwise stable networks. A network is pairwise stable if no player
beneﬁts from severing one of their links and no other two players beneﬁt from adding a
link between them, with one beneﬁting strictly and the other at least weakly. Another
approach is to analyze the process of network formation in a dynamic framework.2 Jack-
son and Watts (2002) have proposed a dynamic process in which individuals form and
sever links based on the improvement that the resulting network oﬀers them relative to
the current network. This deterministic dynamic process may end at stable networks or
in some cases may cycle. To explore whether some networks might be regarded as more
reasonable than others, Jackson and Watts (2002) add to this deterministic process ran-
dom perturbations and examine the distribution over networks as the level of random
perturbations vanishes.
Exploiting the tree construction of Freidlin and Wentzel (1984), Jackson and Watts
(2002) have shown that the outcome of their selection process (called stochastically stable
networks) can be fully characterized in terms of resistances. However, these results are
not always helpful in determining the outcome, because the required computation for
resistances and the tree construction may be quite complex. To be more precise, this
problem is known to be NP-complete in complexity theory.3 Thus we do not have much
knowledge on which network will arise in these processes in general. In order to extend the
applicability of these results, more succinct criteria are needed to determine the outcome
of this selection theory. One goal of the paper is to ﬁnd a criterion for network selection
that is free from the computation of resistances and the tree construction.4
1Jackson (2003, 2004) has provided a survey of models of network formation.
2Watts (2001) has extended the Jackson and Wolinsky model to a dynamic process but she has limited
attention to the speciﬁc contest of the connections model and a particular deterministic dynamic.
3See Garey and Johson (1979, p.206). We know that for NP-complete problems, all known algorithms
to solve the problem require time which is exponential in the problem size (for instance in the number of
individuals considered).
4In noncooperative games Young (1993), Ellison (1993), Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) among
others have applied the Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) techniques in order to provide evolutionary models
that select among (strict) Nash equilibria. But these results are submitted to the same criticism than
1We propose a new concept, p−pairwise stability, which is a reﬁnement of the notion of
pairwise stability. A network is said to be p−pairwise stable if when we add a set of links
to this network (or sever a set of links), then if we allow players to successively create or
delete links, they will come back to the initial network. The parameter p ∈ [0,1] indicates
the "number" of links that can be modiﬁed: p =0m e a n st h a ta l ll i n k sm a yb em o d i ﬁ e d ,
p =1m e a n st h a tn ol i n km a yb ea d d e do rs e v e r e d . T h u s ,1−pairwise stability reverts
to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) pairwise stability concept. Also, a network is said to be
1
2−pairwise stable if when we add a set of links to this network (or sever a set of links)
such that the number of changes is less than half the total of possible changes, then if
we allow players to successively create or delete links, they will come back to the initial
network.
We show that when a 1
2−pairwise stable network exists, it is unique. Moreover it is
the only stochastically stable network in Jackson and Watts (2002) stochastic evolutionary
process. But while our notion of a 1
2−pairwise stable network leads to a unique selection
when it exists, it does not always exist. Therefore, we deﬁne its set-valued extension with
the notion of 1
2−pairwise stable set of networks that is proved to exist and to coincide
with the 1
2−pairwise stable network when it exists. We also show that if a network is
stochastically stable then it belongs to the 1
2−pairwise stable set of networks. Thus, any
network outside the 1
2−pairwise stable set must be considered as a non-robust network.
Interestingly, the 1
2−pairwise stable set of networks can contain no pairwise stable network.
We see this as a drawback of pairwise stability, and we provide examples where a set of
networks is more "stable" than a pairwise stable network.
The paper is organized as follows. InSection 2 we deﬁne the notion of p−pairwise stable
network and we study its properties. In Section 3 we propose a set-valued extension, the
p−pairwise stable set of networks. In Section 4 we provide an evolutionary foundation to
the 1
2−pairwise stable set of networks. In Section 5 we conclude.
2 p−Pairwise Stable Networks
Let N = {1,...,n} be the ﬁnite set of players who are connected in some network rela-
tionship. The network relationships are reciprocal and the network is thus modeled as a
Jackson and Watts (2002) and so they are not always helpful in determining the selected action proﬁles.
Then, some authors have looked for criteria for equilibrium (or non-equilibrium) selection that are free
from the computation of resistances and the tree construction. For instance, Young (1993) has shown
that in a two player, two action game, only the risk-dominant equilibrium (in the sense of Harsanyi and
Selten (1988)) is stochastically stable. This result was generalized by Maruta (1997) and Durieu, Solal and
Tercieux (2003) to two players ﬁnite games.
2non-directed graph.5 Individuals are the nodes in the graph and links indicate bilateral
relationships between individuals. Thus, a network g is simply a list of which pairs of
individuals are linked to each other. If we are considering a pair of individuals i and j,
then {i,j}∈g indicates that i and j are linked under the network g. For simplicity, we
write ij to represent the link {i,j},a n ds oij ∈ g indicates that i and j are linked under
the network g.L e t gN be the set of all subsets of N of size 2. GN denotes the set of
a l lp o s s i b l en e t w o r k so rg r a p h so nN,w i t hgN being the complete network. The network
obtained by adding link ij to an existing network g is denoted g + ij and the network
obtained by deleting link ij from an existing network g is denoted g−ij. For any network
g,l e tN(g)={i |∃ j such that ij ∈ g} be the set of players who have at least one link in
the network g.
Diﬀerent network conﬁgurations lead to diﬀerent values of overall production or overall
utility to players. These various possible valuations are represented via a value function.
A value function is a function v : GN → R. The set of all possible value functions is
denoted V. A value function only keeps track of how the total societal value varies across
diﬀerent networks. We also wish to keep track of how that value is allocated or distributed
among the players forming a network. An allocation rule is a function Y : GN ×V→RN
such that
￿
i∈N Yi(g,v)=v(g) for all v and g. It is important to note that an allocation
rule depends on both g and v. This allows an allocation rule to take full account of a
player i’s role in the network. This includes not only what the network conﬁguration is,
but also and how the value generated depends on the overall network structure.
In evaluating societal welfare, we may take various perspectives.6 An e t w o r kg is Pareto
eﬃcient relative to v and Y if there does not existany g  ⊆ GN such that Yi(g ,v) ≥ Yi(g,v)
for all i with strict inequality for some i. This deﬁnition of eﬃciency of a network takes
Y as ﬁxed, and hence can be thought of as applying to situations where no intervention
is possible. A network g ⊆ GN is strongly eﬃcient relative to v if v(g) ≥ v(g ) for all
g  ⊆ GN. This is a strong notion of eﬃciency as it takes the perspective that value is fully
transferable.
A simple way to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the long
run is to examine a sort of equilibrium requirement that agents not beneﬁt from altering
the structure of the network. A weak version of such condition is the pairwise stability
notion deﬁned by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). A network is pairwise stable if no player
5Bala and Goyal (2000) have studied network formation in directed networks. See also Dutta and
Jackson (2000).
6Throughout the paper we use the notation ⊆ for weak inclusion and ￿ for strict inclusion. We also
use the symbols ∨ and ∧ which mean "or" and "and", respectively. Finally, # will refer to the notion of
cardinality.
3beneﬁts from severing one of their links and no other two players beneﬁt from adding a
link between them, with one beneﬁting strictly and the other at least weakly.
Deﬁnition 1 An e t w o r kg is pairwise stable with respect to value function v and allocation
rule Y if
(i) for all ij ∈ g, Yi(g,v) ≥ Yi(g − ij,v) and Yj(g,v) ≥ Yj(g −ij,v),a n d
(ii) for all ij / ∈ g,i fYi(g,v) <Y i(g + ij,v) then Yj(g,v) >Y j(g +ij,v).
L e tu ss a yt h a tg  is adjacent to g if g  = g+ij or g  = g−ij for some ij.An e t w o r kg 
defeats g if either g  = g−ij and Yi(g ,v) >Y i(g,v),o ri fg  = g+ij with Yi(g ,v) ≥ Yi(g,v)
and Yj(g ,v) ≥ Yj(g,v) with at least one inequality holding strictly. Pairwise stability is
equivalent to saying that a network is pairwise stable if it is not defeated by another (nec-
essarily adjacent) network. The following example shows the main insight of the stability
requirement we will introduce. In particular, the example shows that a network that is
both pareto-dominant and pairwise stable can be "less stable" than another network.
Example 1. Consider a situation where four players can form links. The payoﬀs they
obtained from the diﬀerent network conﬁgurations are (see Figure 1): for a non-empty
network g, Yi(g)=# ( g) if i ∈ N(g) with #(g) being the number of links in g, Yi(g)=0
if i/ ∈ N(g),a n dYi(g)=1 0if g is the empty network. Both the empty network and the
complete network are pairwise stable networks. The empty network is also the eﬃcient
network.
Suppose that at least two links are added to the empty network to form g .T h e n ,f r o m
g  all "undefeated" improving paths go to the complete network and none goes back to
the empty network. An improving path is a sequence of networks that can emerge when
players form or sever links based on the improvement the resulting network oﬀers relative
to the current network. Each network in the sequence diﬀers by one link from the previous
one. If a link is added, then the two players involved must both agree to its addition, with
at least one of the two strictly beneﬁting from the addition of the link. If a link is deleted,
then it must be that at least one of the two players involved in the link strictly beneﬁts
from its deletion. By an "undefeated" improving path, we mean that the ﬁnal network
in the sequence of the improving path is not defeated. Suppose now that at most four
links are deleted from the complete network to form g  .T h e n ,f r o mg   all "undefeated"
improving paths go back to the complete network. Thus, we say that the empty network



















































































Figure 1: The empty and complete networks are pairwise stable (Example 1).
In order to formalize such reﬁnement of pairwise stability, we ﬁrst deﬁne a notion of
distance between two networks. For g,g  ⊆ gN we denote by
d(g,g ) ≡
#{ij ∈ gN | (ij ∈ g ∧ij / ∈ g ) ∨ (ij / ∈ g ∧ ij ∈ g )}
#gN
the distance between g and g .T h a t i s ,d(g,g ) is the number of links that g does have
while g  does not, plus the number of links that g does not have while g  does, the total
being divided by the maximum number of links. Thus, 0 ≤ d(g,g ) ≤ 1.T h e f o r m a l
deﬁnition of an improving path is due to Jackson and Watts (2002). An improving path
from a network g t oan e t w o r kg  is a ﬁnite sequence of graphs g1,...,g K with g1 = g and
gK = g  such that for any k ∈{ 1,...,K− 1} either:
(i) gk+1 = gk − ij for some ij such that Yi(gk −ij) >Y i(gk),o r
(ii) gk+1 = gk + ij for some ij such that Yi(gk +ij) >Y i(gk) and Yj(gk + ij) ≥ Yj(gk).
5T h el e n g t ho fa ni m p r o v i n gp a t hi sK − 1, K ≥ 2. If there exists an improving path
from g  to g, then as Jackson and Watts (2002) we use the symbol g  → g.F o rag i v e n
network, g,l e tim(g)={g  ⊆ gN | g  → g}.T h i si st h es e to fn e t w o r k sf o rw h i c ht h e r ei s
an improving path leading from g  to g. An improving path from g  to g is of maximum
length if gK is not defeated by any g   ⊆ gN.F o rg   = g,w ew r i t eg   −→ g if:
(i) all improving paths of maximum length from g  go to g,
(ii) there does not exist an inﬁnite improving path from g .7
We write g  −→ g if from g there is no improving path. For a given network g,l e t
IM(g)={g  ⊆ gN | g   −→ g}.I nt h es e q u e l ,w en o t eφ(p) the largest number smaller or
equal to p such that φ(p)· #gN is an integer. This notation will be useful in deﬁning our
notion of p−pairwise stable networks.
Deﬁnition 2 Let p ∈ [0,1].An e t w o r kg is p−pairwise stable with respect to allocation
rule Y and value function v if for all g  ⊆ gN such that d(g ,g) ≤ 1 − φ(p),w eh a v e
g  ∈ IM(g).
Any network g that is p−pairwise stable is p −pairwise stable for p  ≥ p. The notion of
p−pairwise stability is a reﬁnement of pairwise stability in the following sense. A network
g is pairwise stable if and only if it is 1−pairwise stable. Thus, any network g that is
p−pairwise stable is pairwise stable.
Proposition 1 Let p ≤ 1
2.Ap−pairwise stable network is unique when it exists.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Let us assume that g1 and g2 are two dis-
tinct p−pairwise stable networks where p ≤ 1
2.T h e n , t h e y a r e 1
2−pairwise stable. If
d(g1,g2) ≤ 1 − φ(1
2), we have a straightforward contradiction. (Since we must have
g1 ∈ IM(g2), i.e. g1  −→ g2 which is not possible since g1( = g2) is pairwise stable
(or indiﬀerently 1−pairwise stable).
Assume now that d(g1,g2) > 1−φ(1
2).P i c kg1 and delete elements in {(ij ∈ g1∧ij / ∈ g2)}
and add elements in {(ij / ∈ g1 ∧ ij ∈ g2)} so that we obtain a network g  satisfying
d(g ,g1)=1−φ(1
2). By construction, this network g  satisﬁes d(g ,g2) ≤ φ(1
2) ≤ 1−φ(1
2).
Then, since g1 and g2 are 1
2−pairwise stable, we have that g  ∈ IM(g1), i.e. g   −→ g1,
7An inﬁnite improving path from g is an inﬁnite sequence of graphs g1,g 2,... such that for any k ∈
{1,2,3,...} either (i) gk+1 = gk − ij for some ij such that Yi(gk − ij) >Y i(gk),o r( i i )gk+1 = gk + ij for
some ij such that Yi(gk + ij) >Y i(gk) and Yj(gk + ij) ≥ Yj(gk). Thus, no network is not defeated in an
inﬁnite improving path.
6and g  ∈ IM(g2), i.e. g   −→ g2, which is not possible since g2  = g1.
In Example 1, the empty network is pairwise stable and is the unique strongly stable
network.8 However, the complete network is the unique 1
2−pairwise stable network. The
reason is that from any network g  with #(g ) ≥ 3 (or d(g ,gN) ≤ 1
2) any "undefeated"
improving paths go to the complete network gN, but none goes to the empty network.9
The next two examples show that a 1
2−pairwise stable network may fail to exist while
a pairwise stable network exists. In the ﬁrst example, none of the two pairwise stable
networks is 1
2−pairwise stable, because there exists a network at mid distance from which
there are improving paths going to both pairwise stable networks. In the second example,
the unique pairwise stable is not 1
2−pairwise stable because improving paths are enclosed
in a cycle.
Example 2. Consider a situation where four players can form links. The payoﬀs
they obtained from the diﬀerent network conﬁgurations are (see Figure 2): Yi(g)=
[#(g)]2 − c · #{j ∈ N such that ij ∈ g} if i ∈ N(g), Yi(g)=0if i/ ∈ N(g), (and so,
Yi(g)=0if g is the empty network). The parameter c>0 is the individual cost of form-
ing a link. For c<11 the complete network is pairwise stable, for c>1 the empty network
is pairwise stable. For c<5 our reﬁnement will select the complete network which is the
unique 1
2−pairwise stable network. For c>7 the empty network is the unique 1
2−pairwise
stable network. But, if 5 <c<7 then a 1
2−pairwise stable network fails to exist. The
reason is that at g  = {12,13,34} players 2 and 4 have incentives to form the link 24 but
at the same time players 1 or 3 has an incentive to sever the link he has with 2 or 4.S o ,
from g  some improving paths go to the empty network, while others go to the complete
network. It follows that no 1
2−pairwise stable network exists.
Example 3. Suppose that ﬁve players can form links. In the complete network, Yi(g)=8
for all i.I na n yn e t w o r kg players i/ ∈ N(g) have a payoﬀ Yi(g)=0 .I nn e t w o r k sg such
that #(g) ∈ [3,9],w eh a v eYi(g)=9− #(g) if i ∈ N(g).I n a n y g such that #(g)=1
or 2 and players 4 or 5 belong to N(g) then Yi(g)=0for all i.I n a n y g such that
#(g)=2and players 4 and 5 do not belong to N(g),w eh a v et h a tYi(g)=7for i ∈ N(g).
8Jackson and van den Nouweland (2004) have introduced the notion of strongly stable networks. A
strongly stable network is a network which is stable against changes in links by any coalition of individuals.
Strongly stable networks are Pareto eﬃcient and maximize the overall value of the network if the value of
each component of a network is allocated equally among the members of that component.
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Figure 2: Non-existence of 1
2−stable networks (Example 2).
Finally, let Y1({12})=Y3({13})=Y2({23})=6 , Y2({12})=Y1({13})=Y3({23})=8 .
Figure 3 presents some of these network conﬁgurations. In this example there is a unique
pairwise stable network, the complete network. But, there does not exist a 1
2−pairwise
stable network. Indeed, from any g  such that d(g ,gN) ≥ 1
5, no improving path goes to gN.
Thus, a 1
2−pairwise stable network does not always exist. In the spirit of Tercieux
(2004) we aim to solve the problem of non-existence of 1
2−pairwise stable networks by
providing a set-valued extension. Interestingly, such an approach will put into relief that













































































































































































Figure 3: Another example of non-existence of 1
2−stable networks (Example 3).
3 p−Pairwise Stable Sets of Networks
Let us ﬁrst restate the deﬁnition of an improving path. An improving path from a network
g t oas e to fn e t w o r k sG ⊆ GN is a ﬁnite sequence of graphs g1,...,g K with g1 = g and
gK ∈ G such that for any k ∈{ 1,...,K −1} either:
(i) gk+1 = gk − ij for some ij such that Yi(gk −ij) >Y i(gk),o r
(ii) gk+1 = gk + ij for some ij such that Yi(gk +ij) >Y i(gk) and Yj(gk + ij) ≥ Yj(gk).
T h el e n g t ho fa ni m p r o v i n gp a t hi sK − 1, K ≥ 2. An improving path from g  to
G ⊆ GN is of maximum length if gK is not defeated by any g   / ∈ G.F o rg  / ∈ G,w ew r i t e
g   −→ G if:
(i) all improving paths of maximum length from g  go to G,
9(ii) for any inﬁnite improving path from g ,t h e r ee x i s t sK such that for all k ≥ K,
gk ∈ G.
We write g  −→ G if from g ∈ G there is no improving path going to g  / ∈ G.F o rag i v e n
set of network G,l e tIM(G)={g  ⊆ gN | g   −→ G}. Note that, in the following, for
G ⊆ GN,a n dg  ⊆ gN we will note d(g ,G) ≤ 1 − φ(p) if d(g ,g) ≤ 1 − φ(p) for some
g ∈ G.
Deﬁnition 3 Let p ∈ [0,1].As e to fn e t w o r k sG ⊆ GN is p−pairwise stable with respect
to allocation rule Y and value function v if
(1) for all g  ⊆ gN such that d(g ,G) ≤ 1− φ(p), we have g  ∈ IM(G),
(2) there does not exist G    G such that G  satisﬁes (1).
Remark 1 The set GN (trivially) satisﬁes (1) in Deﬁnition 3 for any p ∈ [0,1].
Proposition 2 Let p ∈ [0,1]. Two (distinct) p−pairwise stable set of networks must be
disjoint.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Assume that G and G  are two (distinct)
p−pairwise stable sets of networks and G ∩ G   = ∅. Then, for all g  ⊆ gN such that
d(g ,G∩G ) ≤ 1−φ(p),w eh a v eg  ∈ IM(G). But since this assertion is also true for G ,
we have that for all g  ⊆ gN such that d(g ,G∩ G ) ≤ 1 − φ(p), g  ∈ IM(G ∩ G ).T h u s
G∩G  satisﬁes (1) in Deﬁnition 3, contradicting the fact that G (and G )a r ep−pairwise
stable sets, i.e. the minimality is violated (point (2) in Deﬁnition 3 of p−pairwise stable
sets).
As underlined earlier, the main drawback of our deﬁnition of 1
2−pairwise stable net-
works is that existence may fail also when a pairwise stable network exists. We now show
that our set-valued notion of 1
2−pairwise stable set always exists. As will become clear
(for instance through Example 3), when there does not exist any 1
2−pairwise stable net-
work, our notion allows to eliminate many possibilities. Moreover, it is possible that the
1
2−pairwise stable set of networks does not contain any pairwise stable network (see Exam-
ple 3). We claim that this last point is important and underlines an important drawback
of pairwise stability. The selection result we will introduce in the next section will give
a foundation to this informal argument since we will prove that any network outside the
1
2−pairwise stable set is not robust in a precise sense.
10Proposition 3 Let p ∈ [0,1]. There always exists at least one p−pairwise stable set of
networks.
Proof. Let us proceed by contradiction. Let p ∈ [0,1] and assume that there does
not exist any set of networks G ⊆ GN that is p−pairwise stable. This means that for any
G0 ⊆ GN that satisﬁes (1) in Deﬁnition 3 (there always exist such a G0,s e eR e m a r k1),
we can ﬁnd a proper subset G1 that satisﬁes (1). But again for G1, we can ﬁnd a proper
subset G2 that satisﬁes (1). Iterating the reasoning we can build an inﬁnite (decreasing)
sequence {Gk}k≥0 of distinct elements of GN satisfying (1).B u ts i n c e#GN < ∞,t h i s
is not possible; so the proof is completed.
Note ﬁrst that if g is a 1
2−pairwise stable network then {g} is a 1
2−pairwise stable set
of networks. What our next result shows in particular is that {g} is the only 1
2−pairwise
stable set of networks and thus the two notions coincide in that special case.
Proposition 4 Let p ≤ 1
2. There always exists a unique p−pairwise stable set of networks.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Assume that G1 and G2 are two distinct
p−pairwise stable networks where p ≤ 1
2. Then, they satisfy (1) in Deﬁnition 3 for
p = 1
2.
If d(G1,G 2) ≤ 1−φ(1
2). Then we have a straightforward contradiction. (Since from g ∈ G1
we must have g ∈ IM(G1), i.e. g  −→ G1 and g ∈ IM(G2), i.e. g  −→ G2 which is not
possible since G1 ∩G2 = ∅.
If d(G1,G 2) > 1 − φ(1
2), we take g1(∈ G1) and g2(∈ G2). Then, pick g1 and delete el-
ements in {(ij ∈ g1 ∧ ij / ∈ g2)} and add elements in {(ij / ∈ g1 ∧ ij ∈ g2)} so that we
obtain a network g  satisfying d(g ,G 1)=1− φ(1
2). By construction, this network g 
satisﬁes d(g ,G 2) ≤ φ(1
2) ≤ 1 − φ(1
2). Then, since G1 and G2 are p−pairwise stable for
p ≤ 1
2 (i.e. they both satisfy (1) in Deﬁnition 3 for p = 1
2), we have that g  ∈ IM(G1), i.e.
g   −→ G1 and g  ∈ IM(G2),i . e .g   −→ G2 which again is not possible since G1∩G2 = ∅.
In Example 2 we have that, for 5 <c<7, there does not exist a 1
2−pairwise stable
network, but the set formed by the complete and empty networks is the 1
2−pairwise stable
set of networks. In Example 3, the complete network is the unique pairwise stable network
and there is no 1
2−pairwise stable network. However, the 1
2−pairwise stable set of networks
is G  = {g1,g 2,g 3,g 4,g 5,g 6} (see Figure 3), which does not include the complete network,
because there is a cycle g1 → g2 → g3 → g4 → g5 → g6 → g1 and all "undefeated"
improving paths from any g  such that d(g ,G  ) ≤ 1
2 go to G  and stay in G .B y a n
11"undefeated" improving path, we mean that the ﬁnal network in the sequence of the
improving path is not defeated by a network that does not belong to G .
Our set-valued notion generalizes many existing concepts of the literature. We can
easily link this to two deﬁnitions, the ﬁrst one is the well-known deﬁnition of pairwise
stable networks of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). The second one is the one of closed
cycle provided by Jackson and Watts (2002). The following straightforward proposition is
stated without proof.
Proposition 5 {g} is a p−pairwise stable set if and only if g is a p−pairwise stable
network. And so, {g} is a 1−pairwise stable set if and only if it is a pairwise stable
network.
The following deﬁnition is due to Jackson and Watts (2002, p.273). A set of networks
G,f o r macycle if for any g ∈ G and g  ∈ G, there exists an improving path connecting g
to g . A cycle G is a closed cycle if no network in G lies on an improving path leading to
an e t w o r kt h a ti sn o ti nG.
Proposition 6 G is a 1−pairwise stable set if and only if it is a closed cycle.
Proof. T h ep r o o fc a nb ef o u n di nA p p e n d i xA .
4 Evolutionary Selection
In this section, we show that our notion of 1
2−pairwise stable networks (and 1
2−pairwise
stable set of networks) is relevant in the stochastic evolutionary process proposed by
Jackson and Watts (2002).
4.1 The Process
Let us recall ﬁrst the Jackson and Watts (2002)’s process. At a discrete set of times,
{1,2,3,...} decisions to add or sever a link are made. At each date, a pair of players ij
is randomly identiﬁed with probability p(ij) > 0. The (potential) link between these two
players is the only link that can be altered at that time. If the link is already in the
network, then the decision is whether to sever it, and otherwise the decision is whether
to add the link. The players involved act myopically, adding the link if it makes each at
least as well oﬀ and one strictly better oﬀ, and severing the link if its deletion makes either
player better oﬀ. After the action is taken, there is some small probability ε>0 that a
12mutation (or tremble, or mistake) occurs and the link is deleted if it is present, and added
if it is absent.10
The above process deﬁnes a (ﬁnite) Markov chain with states being the network in place
at the end of a given period. Note that with mutations as part of the process, each state of
the system is reachable with positive probability from every other state. The Markov chain
is said to be irreducible and aperiodic, and thus has a unique corresponding stationary
distribution (see Freidlin and Wentzel, 1984). As ε goes to zero, the stationary distribution
converges to a unique limiting stationary distribution. A network that is in the support
of the limiting (as ε goes to zero) stationary distribution of the above-described Markov
p r o c e s si ss a i dt ob estochastically stable. Intuitively, a stochastically stable network
is one that is observed inﬁnitely many more times than others when the probability of
mutations is inﬁnitely small. Jackson and Watts (2002) provides a characterization of
stochastically stable networks using the tree construction of Freidlin and Wentzell (1984).
In the following, we prove that our concept can be used to avoid this complex construction.
4.2 Relationship between p−Pairwise Stability and Stochastic Stability
The following theorem shows that under the process we have just described, the only
networks that will arise with a signiﬁcant frequency in the long run (i.e., the stochastically
stable one) are in the 1
2−pairwise stable set.
Theorem 1 Let G be the 1
2−pairwise stable set of networks. The set of stochastically
stable networks is included in G.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Thus any network outside the 1
2−pairwise stable set must be considered as a non-robust
network. To be more precise, the stochastic process presented above can be thought of as
a check on the robustness of pairwise networks or cycles. Although a number of networks
may be pairwise stable, they can diﬀer in how resilient they are to the random mutations.
F o ri n s t a n c e ,i tm a yb er e l a t i v e l yh a r dt ol e a v ea n de a s yt og e tb a c kt os o m en e t w o r k s ,
our above theorem tells us that such networks are included in the 1
2−pairwise stable set of
networks. This result also tells us that any network that is not in the 1
2−pairwise stable
s e ti sr e l a t i v e l ye a s yt ol e a v ea n dh a r dt og e tb a c k .
10Mutations may be due to exogenous unmodeled factors that are beyond player’s control. Alternatively,
players may simply make errors in calculating whether adding or severing a link is beneﬁcial. Finally, we
could think to players having a limited information. Thus they occasionally experiment to see if adding or
severing a link will make them better oﬀ (endogenous mutations have been formalized in several papers,
see for instance van Damme and Weibull (2002) or Maruta (2002)).
13In order to understand these points, note that once the process has reached the
1
2−pairwise stable set of networks G, it cannot leave it without further mutations. On the
ﬁrst hand, in order to get oﬀ that set, it is necessary that strictly more than
#gN
2 muta-
tions occur (notice that in order to give the intuition of our result, we skip some technical
points in assuming that N is such that
#gN
2 is an integer). If it is not the case, the process
will come back to G with no further mutation. On the other hand, as it will become clear,
i ft h ep r o c e s sh a sr e a c h e dan e t w o r kt h a ti so u t s i d eG,i ti ss u ﬃ c i e n tt h a tl e s st h a n
#gN
2
mutations occur to allow the process to reach a network that belong to G. In order to see
w h yi ti ss o ,n o t et h a tf r o man e t w o r kg  that does not belong to G, with (less than)
#gN
2
mutations, one can reach a network ¯ g such that d(g,¯ g) ≤ 1
2 where g belongs to G.T h u s ,
by deﬁnition, the process will move to G without any further mutations. To see how we
can build ¯ g,w ej u s th a v et oa d dl i n k st og  that belong to g and not to g  or to delete
links that do not belong to g but belong to g . By repeating this procedure less than
#gN
2
times, we can reach such a ¯ g. Thus there exist networks in G which are the easiest to
reach from other networks, where - again - "easiest" is interpreted as requiring the fewest
mutations. These networks are stochastically stable. The formal argument is given in the
appendix.
Of course, we would like to have a full characterization of the set of stochastically
stable networks. In order to do so, we provide several suﬃcient conditions that go in that
sense. These results are corollaries of Theorem 1. The ﬁrst one shows that if there exists a
1
2−pairwise stable network then it must be the unique stochastically stable network. Note
that this result can be seen as a parallel to the one of Young (1993) [Theorem 3,p . 72]i n
noncooperative games.
Corollary 1 Assume that a network g is the 1
2−pairwise stable network. Then g is the
unique stochastically stable network.
The following two corollaries directly come from the fact that if g is stochastically stable
then g is part of a 1−pairwise stable set of networks. Furthermore, if g ∈ G is stochastically
stable and G is a 1−pairwise stable set then all g  ∈ G are stochastically stable (this
follows from Lemma 2 in Jackson and Watts (2002) together with our Proposition 6 that
establishes the equivalence between a 1−pairwise stable set and a closed cycle).
Corollary 2 Let G be the 1
2−pairwise stable set of networks. If G is 1−pairwise stable
then G is the set of stochastically stable networks.
Corollary 3 Let G be the 1
2−pairwise stable set of networks. If G  ⊆ G is the unique
1−pairwise stable set in G then G  is the set of stochastically stable networks.
14Example 4. Suppose that three players can form links (see Figure 4). In the com-
plete network, Yi(g)=3for all i.I n a n y n e t w o r k g players i/ ∈ N(g) have a payoﬀ
Yi(g)=0 .I n a n y g such that #(g)=2 , Yi(g)=2if i ∈ N(g). Finally, let Y1({12})=
Y3({13})=Y2({23})=1 , Y2({12})=Y1({13})=Y3({23})=4 .I nt h i se x a m p l et h e r ei sa
unique pairwise stable network, the complete network. There does not exist a 1
2−pairwise
stable network, {gN} is the 1−pairwise stable set, and all networks except the empty one
belong to the 1






















































2−pairwise stable set and stochastically stable networks (Example 4).
In Example 4, the complete network is the unique pairwise stable network and there is
no 1
2−pairwise stable network because of the cycle g1 → g2 → g3 → g4 → g5 → g6 → g1.
The 1
2−pairwise stable set of networks is G  = {g1,g 2,g 3,g 4,g 5,g 6,gN} but this set is not
1−pairwise stable. Indeed, {gN} is the unique 1− pairwise stable set and so by corollary
3 is the unique stochastically stable network.
The next example shows that our suﬃcient conditions are quite tight in the following
sense: a p−pairwise stable network with p = 1
2 + ε (ε small) may not be a stochastically
stable network.
Example 5. Suppose that ﬁfty players can form links. For #(g) ≤ 611,l e tYi(g)=
611−#(g) if i ∈ N(g) and Yi(g)=0otherwise. For #(g) ≥ 612,l e tYi(g)=# ( g)−611 if
i ∈ N(g) and Yi(g)=0otherwise. The empty network is a p−pairwise stable network for
p ≥ (615/1225)   0.502, but the empty network is not stochastically stable. The unique
stochastically stable network is the complete one, which is also the unique 1
2−pairwise
15stable network.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have deﬁned a reﬁnement of pairwise stability: p−pairwise stability.
When a 1
2−pairwise stable network exists, we have shown that it is unique and that it
coincides with the unique stochastically stable network. To solve the inexistence problem
of p−pairwise stable networks, we have deﬁned its set-valued extension with the notion of
p−pairwise stable set. We have shown that 1
2−pairwise stable set exists and is unique. In
addition, any stochastically stable networks is included in the 1
2−pairwise stable set.
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 6
In this part we prove Proposition 6 that establishes the equivalence between our notion
of 1−pairwise stability and the notion of a closed cycle proposed by Jackson and Watts
(2002). In order to do so, we ﬁrst state and prove some useful lemmas. The following
lemma is stated without proof.11
Lemma 1 If G is such that for all g ∈ G, g ∈ IM(G) (note that this is (1) in Deﬁnition
3o fa1−pairwise stable set) then there exists C ⊆ G that is a closed cycle.
Our next lemma provides a ﬁrst step in establishing a link between 1−pairwise stability
a n dc l o s e dc y c l e s .
Lemma 2 If C is a closed cycle then there exists G ⊆ C that is 1−pairwise stable.
Proof. Since C is a closed cycle, we know that for all g ∈ C, g ∈ IM(C).T h e n C
satisﬁes (1) of Deﬁnition 3 of a 1−pairwise stable set. Now assume that there does not
exist any G ⊆ C that is 1−pairwise stable. Then any G ⊆ C has a proper subset that
satisﬁes (1) in the deﬁnition of 1−pairwise stable sets. Now, as in the proof of Proposition
3, this implies that there exists an inﬁnite decreasing sequence {Gk}k≥0 where G0 = C
and Gk+1   Gk for all k ≥ 0. But since #GN < ∞, this is not possible; so the proof is
completed.
Now we are ready to complete the proof of Proposition 6. We ﬁrst prove the "if"
part. Suppose that G is a closed cycle but G is not 1−pairwise stable and show that
11A complete proof would mimic the proof of Lemma 1 in Jackson and Watts (2002, p.273).
16this lead to a contradiction. This last point can be due to the violation of (1) or (2)
in the deﬁnition of a 1−pairwise stable set. Assume ﬁrst that (1) is violated. Such a
violation implies in particular that there exists g ∈ G and g  / ∈ G such that g → g .W h i c h
contradicts the deﬁnition of a closed cycle. Assume now that (2) is violated. This means
that there exists G    G that satisﬁes (1) in the deﬁnition of a 1−pairwise stable set i.e.,
for all g  ∈ G ,g   ∈ IM(G ).B u tb yL e m m a1, we know that there exists a closed cycle
C ⊆ G    G. Then, we have the following: ﬁrst, because G is a (closed) cycle, we have
that for all g,g  ∈ G, g → g . But we also have, because C is a closed cycle, that for all
g ∈ C(  G) and g  ∈ G− C, g → g  is wrong. Thus we obtain a contradiction.
We now prove the "only if" part. We know by Lemma 1 that since G is 1−pairwise
stable, there exists C ⊆ G that is a closed cycle. We must prove that C = G.S ol e tu s
proceed by contradiction and assume that C   G. We know by Lemma 2 that there exists
G  ⊆ C   G that is 1−pairwise stable. This leads to a straightforward contradiction since
it contradicts (2) (the minimality) in the 1−pairwise stability of G. This completes the
p r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6.
BP r o o f o f T h e o r e m 1
In order to prove Theorem 1, we ﬁrst introduce some useful deﬁnitions and notations.
B.1 Deﬁnitions
For a given network g, remember that im(g)={g  ⊆ gN |there exists an improving path
from g  to g}.Ap a t hp = {g1,...,gK} is a sequence of adjacent networks. The resistance of






0 if gi ∈ im(gi+1)
1 otherwise
.
Resistance keeps track of how many mutations must occur along a special path to follow
that path from one network to another. A mutation is necessary to move from one network
to an adjacent one whenever it is not in the relevant player’s interests to sever or add the
link that distinguishes the two adjacent networks.
Let r(g ,g)=m i n {r(p) | p is a path from g  to g} and set r(g,g)=0 .N o t e t h a t
r(g ,g)=0iﬀ g  ∈ im(g) or g  = g. Thus (by proposition 6) if g,g  ∈ G where G is
1−pairwise stable, then r(g ,g)=0 .
Given a network g,ag−tree is a directed graph which has as vertices all networks and
has a unique directed path leading from each g  to g.L e tT(g) denote all the g−trees, and
17represent a t ∈ T(g) as a collection of ordered pairs of networks, so that g g   ∈ t if and
only if there is a directed edge connecting g  to g   in the g−tree t.
The resistance of a network g is computed as r(g)=m i n t∈T(g)
￿
g g  ∈t r(g ,g  ).T h e
main result of Jackson and Watts (2002) that is closely related to the technics developed
in Young (1993) is that the set of stochastically stable networks is the set {g | r(g) ≤ r(g )
for all g }. We will use this characterization in order to prove our main results.
B.2 The Proof
The proof is divided into two parts: (1) we bound the resistances of paths that begin
at g ∈ G and the resistances of paths ending at g ∈ G; (2) we show that some g ∈ G
minimizes stochastic potential.
(1) We give a lower bound on the resistance of the transitions that begin at g ∈ G and
end at any g  / ∈ G. Recall that by deﬁnition of p−pairwise stability for p ≤ 1





We give now an upper bound on the resistance of paths that begin at any g  / ∈ G
and end in G.P i c k g  / ∈ G.( N o t e t h a t i f d(g ,G) ≤ 1 − φ(1
2) then, by deﬁnition of G,
g  ∈ IM(G) i.e. no mutation is necessary to go to G. Thus we will implicitly assume
that d(g ,G) > 1 − φ(1
2).) We delete elements in {(ij ∈ g  ∧ ij / ∈ g)} and add elements
in {(ij / ∈ g  ∧ ij ∈ g)} so that we obtain a network ¯ g satisfying d(¯ g,g )=1− φ(1
2).B y
construction, this network ¯ g satisﬁes d(¯ g,g) ≤ φ(1
2) ≤ 1 − φ(1
2) where g ∈ G.B u t G is
a p−pairwise stable set of networks for p ≤ 1
2; therefore with less than (1 − φ(1
2)) · #gN
mutations, we will reach a network in G (note that once the process has reached G,w e
cannot leave it without mutations). Therefore, r(g ,˜ g) ≤ (1−φ(1
2))·#gN for some ˜ g ∈ G.
We will note such a ˜ g by Ψ(g ). Thus for every g  / ∈ G, r(g ,Ψ(g )) ≤ (1 − φ(1
2))· #gN.
(2) Suppose by contradiction that g  / ∈ G is stochastically stable. Denote by t  (one
of) the g −tree(s) (t  ∈ T(g )) that minimizes resistance.
We know that there is a sequence g1,...,g n with g1 =Ψ ( g )( ∈ G) and gn = g  such
that:
- glgl+1 ∈ t  for every l =1 ,...,n−1
-t h e r ei sak ∈{ 1,...,n−1} such that gk ∈ G and gk+1 / ∈ G. Delete this edge and add
one from g  to Ψ(g ). We obtain a tree t   ∈ T(gk) where gk ∈ G.
By construction, r(gk)=r(g ) − r(gk,g k+1)+r(g ,Ψ(g )). But as proved above, we
have r(gk,g k+1) > (1 −φ(1
2))·#gN ≥ r(g ,Ψ(g )). Hence, r(gk) <r (g ). This contradicts
the fact that g  minimizes stochastic potential. This completes the proof.
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